Management Equity Ownership, Debt and Performance: Some Evidence from UK Management Buyouts
This paper presents an empirical examination of the effectiveness of the incentive arrangements incorporated in management buyouts. It calculates and analyzes the excess returns to capital between buyout and public share offering for a sample of U.K. buyouts obtaining a market quotation between 1984 and 1989. After controlling for agency and signaling factors associated with the flotation and for firm-specific characteristics, management equity share emerges as the dominant influence on performance. This result is consistent with the view that the management buyout is principally a device to increase managerial motivation. Copyright 1992 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 39 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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