Multinational Enterprise and Strikes: Theory and Evidence
This paper considers the relationship between multinational enterprise and strike behavior. Bargaining between unions and multinational firms is modeled as a repeated game with asymmetric information about the latter. The analysis leads to the testable prediction that multinational enterprises will be more strike prone than firms that are not diversified across national boundaries. New evidence is presented that supports the theory. Copyright 1992 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 39 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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