The Economics of Shame in Work Groups: How Mutual Monitoring Can Decrease Cooperation in Teams
Recent economic theory suggests that free riding under group piece-rate incentive schemes can be alleviated by mutual monitoring and social sanctioning. This assumption is challenged by showing that the presence of the price mechanism in mutual monitoring and sanctioning can decrease the motivation to cooperate for certain types of agents: because the social rewards which may develop through work can be egoistically motivated, withholding disapproval matters less to cooperative agents. Hence, mutual monitoring can decrease cooperation in teams depending upon the proportion of normatively vs. egoistically motivated types. Evidence for these cognitive mechanisms from experimental social psychology is presented with a mathematical model. Copyright 2001 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Volume (Year): 54 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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