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Venture Capital and Capital Allocation

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  • GIORGIA PIACENTINO

Abstract

I show that venture capitalists' motivation to build reputation can have beneficial effects in the primary market, mitigating information frictions and helping firms go public. Because uninformed reputation‐motivated venture capitalists want to appear informed, they are biased against backing firms—by not backing firms, they avoid taking low‐value firms to market, which would ultimately reveal their lack of information. In equilibrium, reputation‐motivated venture capitalists back relatively few bad firms, creating a certification effect that mitigates information frictions. However, they also back relatively few good firms, and thus, reputation motivation decreases welfare when good firms are abundant or profitable.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgia Piacentino, 2019. "Venture Capital and Capital Allocation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 74(3), pages 1261-1314, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:74:y:2019:i:3:p:1261-1314
    DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12756
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    Cited by:

    1. Anokhin, Sergey & Morgan, Todd & Schulze, William & Wuebker, Robert, 2022. "Is a reputation for misconduct harmful? Evidence from corporate venture capital," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 65-76.
    2. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Li Jing & Huying Zhang, 2023. "Venture Capital, Compensation Incentive, and Corporate Sustainable Development," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-19, March.
    4. Christian Catalini & Jorge Guzman & Scott Stern, 2019. "Hidden in Plain Sight: Venture Growth with or without Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 26521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Khanna, Naveen & Mathews, Richmond D., 2022. "Skill versus reliability in venture capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 41-63.
    6. Jason Roderick Donaldson & Giorgia Piacentino & Anjan Thakor, 2021. "Intermediation Variety," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(6), pages 3103-3152, December.

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