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Tax-Exempt Debt and the Capital Structure of Nonprofit Organizations: An Application to Hospitals

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  • Wedig, Gerard J
  • Hassan, Mahmud
  • Morrisey, Michael A

Abstract

The availability of tax-exempt financing provides nonprofit (NP) organizations with their own tax-based incentives to issue debt. In this article, we develop a theoretical model in which NPs gain an indirect arbitrage from tax-exempt debt issuance, constrained by: (1) the requirement that fixed investment exceed tax-exempt debt flows (the project financing constraint), and (2) the constraint against share issuance. These constraints cause them to impute tax benefits to projects that afford access to the tax-exempt bond market. Empirical tests indicate that NP hospitals behave as if they have target levels of tax-exempt debt. Debt targeting is constrained by the availability of capital projects, while excess debt capacity stimulates investment. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.

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  • Wedig, Gerard J & Hassan, Mahmud & Morrisey, Michael A, 1996. "Tax-Exempt Debt and the Capital Structure of Nonprofit Organizations: An Application to Hospitals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1247-1283, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:51:y:1996:i:4:p:1247-83
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    Cited by:

    1. Amanda Beck & Collin Gilstrap & Jordan Rippy & Brian Vansant, 2021. "Strategic reporting by nonprofit hospitals: an examination of bad debt and charity care," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 933-970, September.
    2. William M. Gentry & John Penrod, 2000. "The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing Not-for-Profit and For-Profit Institutions, pages 285-324, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Margaret Lamb & Andrew Lymer, 1999. "Taxation research in an accounting context: future prospects and interdisciplinary perspectives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(4), pages 749-776.
    4. Gentry, William M., 2002. "Debt, investment and endowment accumulation: the case of not-for-profit hospitals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 845-872, September.
    5. Wenli Yan & Dwight V. Denison & J.S. Butler, 2009. "Revenue Structure and Nonprofit Borrowing," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(1), pages 47-67, January.
    6. Jill R. Horwitz, 2005. "Does Corporate Ownership Matter? Service Provision in the Hospital Industry," NBER Working Papers 11376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mariarosa Scarlata & Luisa Alemany, 2010. "Deal Structuring in Philanthropic Venture Capital Investments: Financing Instrument, Valuation and Covenants," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-145, September.
    8. Mahmud Hassan & Gerard Wedig & Michael Morrisey, 2000. "Charity Care by Non-profit Hospitals: The Price of Tax-exempt Debt," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 47-62.
    9. John R. Bowblis, 2011. "Ownership conversion and closure in the nursing home industry," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(6), pages 631-644, June.
    10. Miglo, Anton, 2004. "Pecking order theory for government finance," MPRA Paper 89017, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2018.
    11. Mitch Towner, 2020. "Debt and Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from U.S. Hospitals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2083-2098, May.
    12. Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci & Ermanno Tortia, 2022. "Strong client orientation, little leverage in nonprofit firms?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 541-563, January.
    13. Daniel Friesner & Robert Rosenman, 2002. "A Dynamic Property Rights Theory of the Firm," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 311-333.

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