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The Extent and Impact of Enterprise Training: The Case of Kitakyushu City

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  • Masako Kurosawa

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  • Masako Kurosawa, 2001. "The Extent and Impact of Enterprise Training: The Case of Kitakyushu City," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 224-242.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecrev:v:52:y:2001:i:2:p:224-242
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Itoh Hideshi, 1993. "Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 410-427.
    2. Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose & Alessio DAmato, 2004. "Multitask Rank Order Tournaments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, pages 1-10.
    3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:10:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-401, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 296-322.
    7. Legros, Patrick & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Efficiency in partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 296-322.
    8. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-720, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    9. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    10. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 158-178.
    12. Mark Armstrong, 1999. "Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 151-168.
    13. Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010. "Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 2241-2259.
    14. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 138-167.
    15. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    16. Ching-To Ma, 1988. "Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 555-572.
    17. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 138-167.
    18. Hitoshi Matsushiima, 2006. "Relative Performance Evaluation between Multitask Agents," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-419, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    19. Munetomo Ando & Noriyuki Yanagawa, 2004. "Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-276, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    20. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Small Fines: Penance Contract," CARF F-Series CARF-F-208, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    21. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 993-1008.
    22. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ariga, Kenn & Kurosawa, Masako & Ohtake, Fumio & Sasaki, Masaru & Yamane, Shoko, 2013. "Organization adjustments, job training and productivity: Evidence from Japanese automobile makers," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, pages 1-34.
    2. Toshie Ikenaga & Daiji Kawaguchi, 2013. "Labour-Market Attachment And Training Participation," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, pages 73-97.
    3. Hara, Hiromi, 2014. "The impact of firm-provided training on productivity, wages, and transition to regular employment for workers in flexible arrangements," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, pages 336-359.
    4. Kitao, Sagiri, 2015. "Pension reform and individual retirement accounts in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, pages 111-126.
    5. Kenn Ariga & Masako Kurosawa & Fumio Ohtake & Masaru Sasaki & Shoko Yamane, 2010. "Organization Adjustments, Job Training and Productivity: Evidence from Japanese Automobile Makers," ISER Discussion Paper 0784, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    6. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Shiho Futagami & Silvia Teuber & Andrea Willi, 2013. "Differences in Initial Training and Wages of Japanese Engineering and Retailing Companies - Who Pays for Higher Training Costs?," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0090, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).

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