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Insider Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: a productivity perspective study in Taiwan's electronics industry

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  • Her‐Jiun Sheu
  • Chi‐Yih Yang

Abstract

In the context of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360), how insider stock ownership relates to firm performance is explored in this paper. The relevant performance measure used is total factor productivity. Insiders are classified into executives, board members and blockholders so as to facilitate a detailed study. Five‐year (1996–2000) panel data of 333 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined. It is observed that total insider ownership remains steady while the executive‐to‐insider holding ratio increases significantly. In terms of the effect on total factor productivity, neither the total insider ownership nor the board‐to‐insider holding ratio shows any influence on productivity. However, productivity first decreases then increases with the executive‐to‐insider holding ratio, forming a U‐shaped relationship. The results indicate that stock ownership of top officers in high‐tech firms should be encouraged to enhance productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Her‐Jiun Sheu & Chi‐Yih Yang, 2005. "Insider Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: a productivity perspective study in Taiwan's electronics industry," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 326-337, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:2:p:326-337
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00426.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Dendi Ramdani & Arjen Witteloostuijn, 2012. "The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 495-507, July.
    2. Da Teng & Chengchun Li & Sailesh Tanna, 2022. "Foreign ownership and productivity in Chinese newly listed firms: the moderating roles of founder’s human capital and social ties," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 1125-1159, September.
    3. Georgeta Vintila & Stefan Cristian Gherghina, 2014. "Insider Ownership and the Value of the Bucharest Stock Exchange Listed Companies: Convergence-of-Interest or Entrenchment Effect?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 4(1), pages 183-195.
    4. Pradiptarathi PANDA & Jinesh PANCHALI, 2019. "Corporate ownership structure and performance: An enquiry into India," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(4(621), W), pages 93-110, Winter.
    5. Victor Chen & Jing Li & Daniel Shapiro, 2011. "Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 115-138, March.
    6. Muhammad Imran Nazir & Muhammad Zulfiqar & Muhammad Bilal Saeed & Yasir Habib, 2016. "The Influence of Board Characteristics on Shareholders Assessment of Risk for Small and Large Firms: Evidence from Pakistan," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(2), pages 596-606.
    7. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2017. "Ownership concentration, state ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market," OSF Preprints zgvsw, Center for Open Science.
    8. Chang, Chong-Chuo, 2023. "The impact of quality of institutions on firm performance: A global analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 694-716.
    9. Chiang, Yao-Min & Chang, Pang-Ru, 2022. "Overinvestment, ownership structure, and directors' and officers’ liability insurance," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 38-50.
    10. Chang, Chong-Chuo & Tang, Hui-Wen, 2021. "Corporate cash holdings and total factor productivity – A global analysis," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    11. Sunny Sun & Xia Zhao & Haibin Yang, 2010. "Executive compensation in Asia: A critical review and outlook," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 775-802, December.
    12. Tsvetkova, Anna, 2021. "Technical efficiency trends of Russian firms in 2013–2018," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 63, pages 91-116.
    13. Lai Trung Hoang & Cuong Cao Nguyen & Baiding Hu, 2017. "Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Improvement: Does it Matter in the Vietnamese Stock Market?," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 36(4), pages 416-428, December.
    14. Panayotis Kapopoulos & Sophia Lazaretou, 2007. "Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: evidence from Greek firms," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 144-158, March.
    15. Suveera Gill & Manika Kohli, 2018. "Perceptual Determinants of Executive Compensation: Survey-Based Evidence from India," Indian Journal of Corporate Governance, , vol. 11(2), pages 159-184, December.
    16. Andreas Högberg, 2011. "Family Ownership and Regional Economic Development in Asia and Europe," ERSA conference papers ersa10p940, European Regional Science Association.
    17. Naiwei Chen & E-N Hsiao, 2014. "Insider ownership and financial flexibility," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(29), pages 3609-3629, October.
    18. repec:agr:journl:v:4(621):y:2019:i:4(621):p:93-110 is not listed on IDEAS

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