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The Waiver Pork Barrel: Committee Membership And The Approval Time Of Medicaid Waivers

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  • ERIC HELLAND

Abstract

Recent growth in Medicaid spending has forced states to look for ways to slow the program's rate of growth. Under the Medicaid program's rules, state governments must submit a waiver to the federal government in order to implement a cost‐saving program. The time required to process a waiver varies from 14 days to over three years. This study examines the determinants of the time it takes to process a waiver and the number of revisions required before final approval. The results indicate that an increase in the tenure of the state's delegation to the House oversight committee reduces the time to approval for Freedom of Choice waivers. However, more liberal committee members appear to delay waivers. The results complement the existing literature on the pork barrel by showing that seniority on a committee is an important determinant‐not only of monetary benefits but also of nonmonetary benefits. (JEL H51, 118)

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Helland, 1999. "The Waiver Pork Barrel: Committee Membership And The Approval Time Of Medicaid Waivers," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 401-411, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:17:y:1999:i:3:p:401-411
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1999.tb00692.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Lea Kosnik, 2010. "Balancing Environmental Protection and Energy Production in the Federal Hydropower Licensing Process," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 86(3).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health

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