IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency - A Research Note


  • Jay Fattorusso
  • Rodion Skovoroda
  • Trevor Buck
  • Alistair Bruce


High levels of executive pay in the USA and the UK have attracted journalistic and academic criticism to the effect that they constitute rent extraction by self-interested executives rather than rewards for raising shareholder returns. The focus of most criticism has been on salary, severance payments and various long-term incentives (particularly share options). However, executive bonuses have attracted little attention and have been only lightly regulated. This raises important questions. Has lighter regulation been associated with significant levels of rent extraction through bonuses, that is, a weak relation between bonus pay and shareholder returns? Have more transparent performance conditions attached to bonuses strengthened the relation, making rent extraction more difficult, or have they acted as camouflage for rent extraction, associated with higher bonus pay but lower pay-performance responsiveness? Are measures of CEO power associated with larger bonuses? This empirical note provides the first, preliminary answers to these questions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Jay Fattorusso & Rodion Skovoroda & Trevor Buck & Alistair Bruce, 2007. "UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency - A Research Note," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 45(3), pages 518-536, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:518-536

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226731445 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. White, Gordon & Howell, Jude A. & Shang Xiaoyuan,, 1996. "In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198289562, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Heem, 2010. "Les critères de détermination de la part variable de la rémunération des dirigeants du CAC 40," Post-Print hal-00476935, HAL.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:45:y:2007:i:3:p:518-536. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.