Agro-Governance: Institutional and Digital Transformation in Agricultural Contracts and the Role of Third Parties in Bulgaria

The article analyses the evolution of governance structures in Bulgarian agriculture during the period 2000–2024, with particular focus on the role of institutional intermediaries (“third parties”) and the impact of digitalisation on agricultural contracts. The study applies the framework of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) and draws on 1,027 empirical observations to trace how the interaction between state administration, private agents and rights holders shapes transaction costs and property protection. The results show a fragmentation of functions reflected in the growing variety of contract types, accompanied by an increase in the number of documents and procedural complexity. Digitalization optimizes certain processes but increases dependence on adaptation to information systems, which in turn raises the time and costs required to process contracts. The analysis reveals that institutional transformation leads to greater formalisation, which does not always translate into higher economic efficiency, especially for small farmers. The study highlights the dual nature of institutional and digital reforms, which tend to transform rather than reduce the complexity of agro-governance.