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China's Anti-Monopoly Law and the role of economics in its enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Heng Ju

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China)

  • Ping Lin

    (Shandong University, Shandong, China
    Lingnan University, Hong Kong SAR, China)

Abstract

China has made significant achievements in enforcing its 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) during the past twelve years. We review the application of economics by the China's competition law enforcers and courts in dealing with antitrust cases. We discuss selected cases to illustrate the application of the relevant theories of competition harms. While the use of economics in its AML enforcement is consistent with international best practice, China can benefit from further raising the deterrence effect of the AML, increasing enforcement resources, and enhancing its cost-effectiveness of its Fair Competition Review system.

Suggested Citation

  • Heng Ju & Ping Lin, 2020. "China's Anti-Monopoly Law and the role of economics in its enforcement," Russian Journal of Economics, ARPHA Platform, vol. 6(3), pages 219-238, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:arh:jrujec:v:6:y:2020:i:3:p:219-238
    DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.6.56362
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    2. John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2014. "Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 672-686, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    China's Anti-Monopoly Law theories of harms administrative monopolies.;

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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