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The Democracy Tax - Politicians' Ignorance and Voters' Lack of Information in a Democratic Contest, a Case Study from the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Vilem Cap

    (Prague University of Economics and Business)

  • Marek Feurich

    (Prague University of Economics and Business)

  • Martin Lukavec

    (Prague University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

This paper highlights an important and neglected democracy limitation: voters make decisions based on incomplete information. This leads to inefficient or irrational decisions and applies to elections at all levels of the political system in the Western world. This paper shows that voting with incomplete information leads to the election of incompetent politicians. Testing of the Prague representatives has shown their lack of knowledge to perform their duties. The regression analysis performed does not show a statistically significant relationship between the representatives knowledge and their education or political experience. A possible solution is a sophisticated training system for elected candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Vilem Cap & Marek Feurich & Martin Lukavec, 2024. "The Democracy Tax - Politicians' Ignorance and Voters' Lack of Information in a Democratic Contest, a Case Study from the Czech Republic," International Journal of Social Sciences, European Research Center, vol. 13(1), pages 13-32, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aop:jijoss:v:13:y:2024:i:1:p:13-32
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; limits of democracy; competence of politicians; inefficiency of governance; rational choice; information asymmetry; education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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