IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Doping und Wettbewerbsintensität

  • Alexander Dilger
  • Frank Tolsdorf

There are systematic incentives to dope within the structure of sports tournaments. A simple decision theory model demonstrates the nature of these incentives and the circumstances in which they are particularly strong. From this model, some empirically testable hypotheses are derived. The most important one, that greater competition between athletes induces more doping, is corroborated by comparing the competitiveness and number of caught dopers in thirteen different athletic sports. The lack of other significant findings may be explained by the decisive role of competitiveness which is more powerful than all other effects and is also a central element of them.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers (2008 onwards); Pay-per-view access from (2000 onwards with 2 years moving wall) and (2008 onwards)

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Duncker & Humblot, Berlin in its journal Schmollers Jahrbuch.

Volume (Year): 130 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 95-116

in new window

Handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqsjb:v130_y2010_i1_q1_p95-116
Contact details of provider: Web page:

Order Information: Web: Email:

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aeq:aeqsjb:v130_y2010_i1_q1_p95-116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gabriele Freudenmann)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.