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Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations

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  • Kyle Rozema
  • Max Schanzenbach

Abstract

Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer's future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, 2023. "Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 80-116, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:15:y:2023:i:3:p:80-116
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20200568
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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