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Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution

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  • Yuichiro Kamada
  • Fuhito Kojima

Abstract

Real matching markets are subject to constraints. For example, the Japanese government introduced a new medical matching system in 2009 that imposes a "regional cap" in each of its 47 prefectures, which regulates the total number of medical residents who can be employed in each region. Based on Kamada and Kojima (2011), this paper studies matching markets with such constraints by examining in great detail the Japanese medical matching market. Specifically, we show that the new system introduced in 2009 has problems in terms of stability and strategy-proofness, and provide an alternative mechanism that does better.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuichiro Kamada & Fuhito Kojima, 2012. "Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 366-370, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:102:y:2012:i:3:p:366-70
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.102.3.366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    2. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2009. "Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 745-749, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Galina Besstremyannaya, 2014. "The efficiency of labor matching and remuneration reforms: a panel data quantile regression approach with endogenous treatment variables," Working Papers w0206, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    2. Ashwin Arulselvan & Agnes Cseh & Martin Groß & David F. Manlove & Jannik Matuschke, 2017. "Matchings with lower quotas: Algorithms and complexity," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1724, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    3. Kolos Csaba Agoston & Peter Biro & Iain McBride, 2016. "Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1632, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    4. Kadam, Sangram Vilasrao, 2017. "Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 56-68.
    5. Sebastian Montaño Correa, 2015. "Compulsory Social Service Matching Market for Physicians in Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 012856, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
    6. repec:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:541-571. is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.

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