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Critères d'attribution des allocations chômage et performances du marché du travail

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  • Gilles Joseph

Abstract

We study the effects of attribution criteria of unemployment benefits in an equilibrium model of unemployment where search intensities and wages are endogenous. Taking full account of an eligibility condition requiring a given work duration in order to benefit from unemployment insurance allow us to qualify the role of wages in the definition of the optimal sequence of unemployment benefits. At a given tax rate, numerical exercises suggest that the fall of the ineligible employees' wages contribute to the efficiency of a declining sequence of unemployment benefits. It is also shown that a stricter eligibility requirement could enhance the employment rate and the welfare of all workers when wages are negotiated. Finally, for the same unemployment rate, the optimal profile setting of unemployment benefits implies that wage flexibility is associated to an utilitarian welfare criterion, whereas wage rigidity is more convenient for a rawlsian one.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Joseph, 2005. "Critères d'attribution des allocations chômage et performances du marché du travail," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 78, pages 117-141.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2005:i:78:p:117-141
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    Cited by:

    1. Solenne Tanguy, 2006. "Recherche d'emploi : entre assurance et incitation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 116(1), pages 43-64.
    2. Ménard, Sébastien & Quintero, Coralia, 2018. "Ausentismo y producción: el esquema de ajuste de primas por siniestralidad observada aplicado al seguro de salud en Francia," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, issue 88, pages 9-50, January.
    3. Sébastien Ménard & Coralia Quintero, 2018. "Absenteeism and productivity: an experience-rating adjustment scheme applied to health insurance in France," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 88, pages 9-50, Enero - J.
    4. Coralia Quintero Rojas & Sébastien Ménard, 2018. "The effects of a bonus-malus workers' compensation system on the labor force structure, productivity, and welfare," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(2), pages 712-719.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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