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Citations for "Implementation with evidence"

by Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier

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  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series 590, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00753473 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents in Economic Environments," Discussion Paper Series 592, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Andrew Clausen (University of Edinburgh), 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," ESE Discussion Papers 225, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  6. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2012. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," PSE Working Papers hal-00753473, HAL.
  7. Sher, Itai, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  8. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  9. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  10. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
  11. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  12. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  13. Midjord, Rune, 2013. "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 261-263.
  14. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
  15. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2012. "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-870, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  16. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-15, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  17. Jackson, Matthew O. & Tan, Xu, 2013. "Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 2-30.