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Managerial Turnover in a Changing World

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Wang, Cheng, 2011. "Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 74-110, January.
  2. Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 819-853.
  3. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
  4. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, 2021. "Performance-Induced CEO Turnover [The “Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: Exit as a form of voice]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(2), pages 569-617.
  5. Siegert, Caspar & Trepper, Piers, 2015. "Optimal tolerance for failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 41-55.
  6. Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
  7. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.
  8. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
  9. Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp, 2015. "Optimal stopping with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 702-727.
  10. Anderson, Ronald & Guibaud, Stéphane & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, 2012. "Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover," CEPR Discussion Papers 9147, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Carrasco, Vinicius & Orenstein, Paulo & Salgado, Pablo, 2016. "When (and how) to favor incumbents in optimal dynamic procurement auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 52-61.
  12. Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu & Feng Gao, 2017. "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2006-2065.
  13. Garrett, Daniel F., 2020. "Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting," TSE Working Papers 20-1140, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  14. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Th'eo Durandard, 2023. "Dynamic delegation in promotion contests," Papers 2308.05668, arXiv.org.
  16. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Post-Print hal-03391936, HAL.
  17. Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul, 2016. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 261-304.
  18. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
  19. Eisfeldt, Andrea L. & Kuhnen, Camelia M., 2013. "CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 351-372.
  20. Battaglini, Marco & Lamba, Rohit, 2019. "Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
  21. Peter Eso & Balazs Szentes, 2014. "Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result," 2014 Meeting Papers 605, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Colak, Gonul & Liljeblom, Eva, 2022. "Easy cleanups or forbearing improvements: The effect of CEO tenure on successor’s performance," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
  23. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017. "Market‐Based Incentives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 331-382, May.
  24. Arie, Guy, 2016. "Dynamic costs and moral hazard: A duality-based approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 1-50.
  25. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9, Sciences Po.
  26. Suehuyn Kwon, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 6621, CESifo.
  27. Huiyi Guo & Wei He & Bin Liu, 2022. "Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing with Endogenous Information Provision," Papers 2209.01453, arXiv.org.
  28. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
  29. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  30. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers hal-03391936, HAL.
  31. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud & Mihail Zervos, 2018. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03391936, HAL.
  32. Ma, Mingze, 2022. "Gendered performance evaluation in CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
  33. Garrett, Daniel F., 2017. "Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 595-612.
  34. Ales, Laurence & Maziero, Pricila & Yared, Pierre, 2014. "A theory of political and economic cycles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 224-251.
  35. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2017_014 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2iclr3ojhv9ko9ord4mpg9odaj is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Karakoç, Gülen & Pagnozzi, Marco & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2022. "The value of transparency in dynamic contracting with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
  38. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zijia, 2021. "Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  39. Meng, Dawen & Sun, Lei & Tian, Guoqiang, 2022. "Dynamic mechanism design on social networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 84-120.
  40. Ronald Anderson & Cecilia Bustamante & Stéphane Guibaud, 2013. "Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji29, Sciences Po.
  41. Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard & Packham, Natalie, 2014. "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," CFS Working Paper Series 475, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  42. Gersbach, Hans & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2017. "Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 11766, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  43. Vasama, Suvi, 2017. "Contracting with long-term consequences," Research Discussion Papers 14/2017, Bank of Finland.
  44. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
  45. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1953rr is not listed on IDEAS
  46. Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2017. "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(1), pages 182-236.
  47. Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018. "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 68784, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  48. Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 775-818.
  49. Wuming Fu & Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org.
  50. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1953rrr is not listed on IDEAS
  51. Eső, Péter & Szentes, Balázs, 2017. "Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  52. Yingkai Li & Jonathan Libgober, 2023. "Optimal Scoring for Dynamic Information Acquisition," Papers 2310.19147, arXiv.org.
  53. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 585-593, 04-05.
  54. Marco Battaglini & Rohit Lamba, 2012. "Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Working Papers 1431, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  55. Zehao Hu, 2014. "Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress," PIER Working Paper Archive 15-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  56. Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016. "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 586-604.
  57. Brochet, Francois & Limbach, Peter & Schmid, Markus M. & Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik, 2019. "CEO tenure and firm value," CFR Working Papers 16-11, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), revised 2019.
  58. Guy Elaad & Artyom Jelnov & Jeffrey Kantor, 2018. "You do not have to succeed, just do not fail: When do soccer coaches get fired?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 269-274, April.
  59. Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022. "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
  60. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  61. Suvi Vasama, 2016. "Dynamic Contracting with Long-Term Consequences: Optimal CEO Compensation and Turnover," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-044, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  62. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2gg54vdji291pb220pomk85ev8 is not listed on IDEAS
  63. Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2022. "Optimal CEO turnover," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
  64. Chifeng Dai, 2021. "Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(1), pages 92-125, February.
  65. Suehyun Kwon, 2016. "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(1), pages 183-205, January.
  66. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Dynamic Managerial Compensation: On the Optimality of Seniority-based Schemes," Discussion Papers 1579, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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