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Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives

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Cited by:

  1. Fredrik Carlsson & Claes Ek & Andreas Lange, 2021. "All It Takes Is One: The Effect of Weakest-Link and Summation Aggregation on Public Good Provision under Threshold Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 9457, CESifo.
  2. Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  3. Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo & Gómez, Santiago & Mantilla, César, 2019. "Between-group competition enhances cooperation in resource appropriation games," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 17-26.
  4. Lisa Bruttel & Tim Friehe, 2011. "Path dependence in public-good games," TWI Research Paper Series 67, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  5. Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2011. "Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 90-92, February.
  6. Maho Nakagawa & Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2022. "Long-lasting effects of incentives and social preference: A public goods experiment," Post-Print hal-03777681, HAL.
  7. Bortolotti, Stefania & Devetag, Giovanna & Ortmann, Andreas, 2016. "Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 60-73.
  8. Yoshio Kamijo & Hiroki Ozono & Kazumi Shimizu, 2016. "Overcoming coordination failure using a mechanism based on gradualism and endogeneity," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 202-217, March.
  9. Lu Dong & Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov, 2018. "Communication, leadership and coordination failure," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 557-584, June.
  10. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2010. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination—Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1892-1912, September.
  11. Arno Riedl & Ingrid M. T. Rohde & Martin Strobel, 2016. "Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 737-767.
  12. Alejandro Caparrós & Esther Blanco & Philipp Buchenauer & Michael Finus, 2020. "Team Formation in Coordination Games with Fixed Neighborhoods," Working Papers 2004, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
  13. Bruttel, Lisa & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On the path dependence of tax compliance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
  14. Anna Lou Abatayo & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, 2017. "One-shot exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination in Denmark, Spain and Ghana," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(11), pages 1-19, November.
  15. Wilfred Amaldoss & Richard Staelin, 2010. "Cross-Function and Same-Function Alliances: How Does Alliance Structure Affect the Behavior of Partnering Firms?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(2), pages 302-317, February.
  16. Chun‐Lei Yang & Mao‐Long Xu & Juanjuan Meng & Fang‐Fang Tang, 2017. "Efficient Large‐Size Coordination Via Voluntary Group Formation: An Experiment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 651-668, May.
  17. Bruttel, Lisa & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "Can short-term incentives induce long-lasting cooperation? Results from a public-goods experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-130.
  18. Yoshio Kamijo & Hiroki Ozono & Kazumi Shimizu, 2014. "A Mechanism That Overcomes Coordination Failure Based on Gradualism, Endogeneity, and Modification," Working Papers 1401, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
  19. Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2020. "Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-17, January.
  20. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Roberto A. Weber, 2015. "Legitimacy, Communication, and Leadership in the Turnaround Game," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(11), pages 2627-2645, November.
  21. Dietmar Fehr, 2011. "The Persistence of "Bad" Precedents and the Need for Communication: A Coordination Experiment," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-039, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  22. Peter H. Kriss & Roberto Weber, 2013. "Organizational formation and change: lessons from economic laboratory experiments," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  23. Christian Zehnder & Holger Herz & Jean-Philippe Bonardi, 2016. "A Productive Clash of Cultures: Injecting Economics into Leadership Research," CESifo Working Paper Series 6175, CESifo.
  24. Yohei Mitani & Kohei Suzuki, 2020. "Facilitating efficient coordination in large groups: small incentive payments in nested groups," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 68-76, June.
  25. Fehr, Dietmar, 2017. "Costly communication and learning from failure in organizational coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 106-122.
  26. Lalin Anik & Lara B Aknin & Michael I Norton & Elizabeth W Dunn & Jordi Quoidbach, 2013. "Prosocial Bonuses Increase Employee Satisfaction and Team Performance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(9), pages 1-8, September.
  27. Masiliūnas, Aidas, 2017. "Overcoming coordination failure in a critical mass game: Strategic motives and action disclosure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 214-251.
  28. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Paichayontvijit, Tirnud & So, Tony, 2015. "Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 85-102.
  29. Christopher Roby, 2021. "Can loss framing improve coordination in the minimum effort game?," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(3), pages 557-588, July.
  30. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas & Shi Qi, 2016. "Stand by Me—Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2916-2936, October.
  31. Yoshio Kamijo & Hiroki Ozono & Kazumi Shimizu, 2015. "A mechanism overcoming coordination failure based on gradualism and endogeneity," Working Papers SDES-2015-11, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Jan 2015.
  32. Cooper, David J. & Ioannou, Christos A. & Qi, Shi, 2018. "Endogenous incentive contracts and efficient coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 78-97.
  33. Mathieu Lefebvre & Anne Stenger, 2016. "Long-lasting effects of temporary incentives in public good games," Working Papers of BETA 2016-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  34. Romero, Julian, 2015. "The effect of hysteresis on equilibrium selection in coordination games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 88-105.
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