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Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Friesen, Lana, 2006. "The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 280-294, May.
  2. André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
  3. Sverre Grepperud, 2005. "Medical Errors: Mandatory Reporting, Voluntary Reporting, or Both?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 99-112, July.
  4. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
  5. Friesen, Lana & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Designing self-reporting regimes to encourage truth telling: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
  6. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
  7. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  8. Anthony Heyes & Andreas Marcel Oestreich, 2018. "A theory of social license when regulatory pressure is jointly produced by an EPA and an NGO," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 219-243, December.
  9. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
  10. Cheng, Chu-Chuan & Lai, Yu-Bong, 2012. "Does a stricter enforcement policy protect the environment? A political economy perspective," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 431-441.
  11. Heyes, Anthony, 2002. "A Theory of Filtered Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 34-46, January.
  12. Paul Calcott, 2010. "Mandated self-regulation: the danger of cosmetic compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 167-179, October.
  13. Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
  14. Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri‐Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487, September.
  15. Heyes, Anthony, 2001. "Honesty in a regulatory context - good thing or bad?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 215-232, February.
  16. Sarah L. Stafford, 2007. "Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self-policing," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 305-326.
  17. Sverre Grepperud, 2005. "Medical Errors: Getting the Incentives Right," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 307-326, December.
  18. Häckner, Jonas & Herzing, Mathias, 2012. "When do Firms Break the Law in Order to Reduce Marginal Cost? - An Application to the Problem of Environmental Inspection," Research Papers in Economics 2012:11, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  19. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 422-433, September.
  20. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  21. Sarah L. Stafford, 2008. "Self‐Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(4), pages 934-951, April.
  22. Vicki M. Bier & Shi‐Woei Lin, 2013. "Should the Model for Risk‐Informed Regulation be Game Theory Rather than Decision Theory?," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(2), pages 281-291, February.
  23. MAHENC Philippe, 2007. "Cooperation among Overlapping Generations for a Public Project," LERNA Working Papers 07.08.229, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  24. Lin, Shi-Woei, 2010. "Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 528-534, May.
  25. Christopher S. Decker, 2007. "Flexible enforcement and fine adjustment," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(4), pages 312-328, December.
  26. Heyes, Anthony & Doucet, Joseph, 1997. "2-Stage Enforcement and Regulatory Polarisation: a Simple Model with Application to the USEPA," Cahiers de recherche 9717, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  27. Tsaur‐Chin Wu & Ching‐Yang Liang & Kun‐Li Lin, 2022. "Environmental effectiveness of tax compliance policy in the presence of labor unions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 137-153, June.
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