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Measurement error and state-dependent pollution control enforcement

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Millock, Katrin & Sunding, David & Zilberman, David, 2002. "Regulating Pollution with Endogenous Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-241, September.
  2. Ya-Po Yang & Jin-Li Hu, 2012. "Gresham’s law in environmental protection," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 103-122, April.
  3. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
  4. Gilpatric, Scott M. & Vossler, Christian A. & Liu, Lirong, 2015. "Using competition to stimulate regulatory compliance: A tournament-based dynamic targeting mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 182-196.
  5. Friesen, Lana, 2003. "Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 72-85, July.
  6. Springborn, Michael R. & Lindsay, Amanda R. & Epanchin-Niell, Rebecca S., 2016. "Harnessing enforcement leverage at the border to minimize biological risk from international live species trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PB), pages 98-112.
  7. Lirong Liu, 2013. "Analysis of Firm Compliance with Multiple Environmental regulations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 1695-1705.
  8. Bertinelli, Luisito & Camacho, Carmen & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution: A differential game approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 237(2), pages 721-728.
  9. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
  10. Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance," Working Papers in Economics 368, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  11. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
  12. Jessica Coria & Xiao-Bing Zhang, 2015. "State-Dependent Enforcement to Foster the Adoption of New Technologies," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(2), pages 359-381, October.
  13. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2010. "Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes," Working Papers in Economics 455, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  14. Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Howitt, Richard E., 1997. "Nonpoint Source Pollution, Incomplete Information and Learning : An Entropy Approach," 1997 Annual Meeting, July 13-16, 1997, Reno\ Sparks, Nevada 35777, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
  15. Andrew Keeler, 1995. "Regulatory objectives and enforcement behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 73-85, July.
  16. Xian Liu & Barrett Kirwan & Andrea Martens, 2018. "Regulatory compliance, information disclosure and peer effects: evidence from the Mexican gasoline market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 53-80, August.
  17. Kofi Otumawu-Apreku, 2013. "Inspection, Compliance and Violation: A Case of Fisheries," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  18. Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
  19. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  20. Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2020. "Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2558-2585, August.
  21. Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2020. "Leveraged enforcement under the EPA’s High Priority Violation Policy," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 1279-1304, March.
  22. Decker, Christopher S. & Pope, Christopher R., 2005. "Adherence to environmental law: the strategic complementarities of compliance decisions," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-5), pages 641-661, September.
  23. Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2014. "High Priority Violation Policy and Targeting Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis of its Effectiveness and Efficiency," Working Papers 1411, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.
  24. Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March.
  25. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2009. "An emission tax pollution control system with imperfect monitoring," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 21-40, March.
  26. Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
  27. Garvie, Devon & Keeler, Andrew, 1993. "Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice," Queen's Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 275224, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
  28. Arun Malik, 2008. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  29. Lin, Shi-Woei, 2010. "Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 528-534, May.
  30. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.
  31. Schmutzler, Armin & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1997. "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-64, January.
  32. Evans, Mary F. & Gilpatric, Scott M. & Liu, Lirong, 2009. "Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 284-292, May.
  33. Franckx, Laurent, 2002. "The Use of Ambient Inspections in Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement When the Inspection Agency Cannot Commit Itself to Announced Inspection Probabilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 71-92, January.
  34. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2009. "An emission tax pollution control system with imperfect monitoring," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 10(1), pages 21-40, March.
  35. Lirong Liu, 2012. "Analysis of Firm Compliance with Multiple Environmental Regulations," Working Papers 1207, Sam Houston State University, Department of Economics and International Business.
  36. Liu, Lirong & Neilson, William, 2013. "Enforcement Leverage with Fixed Inspection Capacity," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 305-328, August.
  37. Arun Malik, 2014. "The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, August.
  38. Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
  39. Kaplan, Jonathan D. & Howitt, Richard E. & Farzin, Y. Hossein, 2003. "An information-theoretical analysis of budget-constrained nonpoint source pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 106-130, July.
  40. Coria, Jessica & Zhang, Xiao-Bing, 2015. "The Harrington Paradox Squared," Working Papers in Economics 608, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  41. François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
  42. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The use of warnings in the presence of errors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 191-201, September.
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