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Participation Games and international environmental agreements: a nonparametric model

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Cited by:

  1. Kornek, Ulrike & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2020. "The strategic dimension of financing global public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  2. Rudik, Ivan, 2018. "Tradable credit markets for intensity standards," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 202-215.
  3. Hong, Fuhai & Karp, Larry, 2012. "International Environmental Agreements with mixed strategies and investment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 685-697.
  4. Kováč, Eugen & Schmidt, Robert C., 2021. "A simple dynamic climate cooperation model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
  5. Karp, Larry & Sakamoto, Hiroaki, 2021. "Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
  6. Karp, Larry & Stevenson, Megan, 2012. "Green Industrial Policy: Trade and Theory," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5qc631q9, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  7. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2018. "Self-enforcing Biodiversity Agreements with Financial Support from North to South," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 43-55.
  8. Ngo Van Long, 2014. "The Green Paradox in Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 4639, CESifo.
  9. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2013. "Trade tariffs and self-enforcing environmental agreements," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 161-13, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
  10. Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016. "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(1), pages 160-204.
  11. Chen, Xudong & Huang, Bihong, 2016. "Club membership and transboundary pollution: Evidence from the European Union enlargement," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 230-237.
  12. Fuhai Hong & Larry Karp, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements with Endogenous or Exogenous Risk," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(3), pages 365-394.
  13. Michael Rauscher, 2019. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: Large Coalitions that Achieve Little," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-7, November.
  14. Toshimasa Maruta & Akira Okada, 2015. "Formation and long-run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 121-135, March.
  15. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola & Van Long, Ngo, 2022. "A dynamic analysis of international environmental agreements under partial cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
  16. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2017. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and trade in fossil energy deposits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-20.
  17. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis & Stefania Strantza, 2023. "Climate Coalitions and their Persistent Ineffectiveness," Discussion Paper Series 2023_04, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Apr 2023.
  18. Kai Lessmann & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Rob Dellink & Johannes Emmerling & Johan Eyckmans & Miyuki Nagashima & Hans-Peter Weikard & Zili Yang, 2015. "The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 811-836, December.
  19. Okada, Akira, 2023. "A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 657-669.
  20. Sareh Vosooghi & Maria Arvaniti & Rick van der Ploeg, 2022. "Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions for Farsighted Countries: Integrated Analysis of Heterogeneous Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 9768, CESifo.
  21. Finus, Michael & McGinty, Matthew, 2019. "The anti-paradox of cooperation: Diversity may pay!," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 541-559.
  22. Michael Finus & Francesco Furini & Anna Viktoria Rohrer, 2021. "International Environmental Agreements and the Paradox of Cooperation: Revisiting and Generalizing Some Previous Results," Graz Economics Papers 2021-05, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  23. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
  24. Hong, Fuhai, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements with reference points," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 68-73.
  25. Hassan Benchekroun & Amrita Ray Chaudhuri, 2015. "Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(6), pages 887-915, December.
  26. Pim Heijnen & Lammertjan Dam, 2019. "Catastrophe and Cooperation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 122-141, March.
  27. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  28. Thomas Kuhn & Radomir Pestow & Anja Zenker, 2022. "Formation of Climate Coalitions and Preferential Free Trade - The Case for Participation Linkage," Chemnitz Economic Papers 057, Department of Economics, Chemnitz University of Technology, revised Nov 2022.
  29. Helm, Carsten & Schmidt, Robert C., 2015. "Climate cooperation with technology investments and border carbon adjustment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 112-130.
  30. Akira Okada, 2023. "Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(2), pages 427-452, February.
  31. Robert C. Schmidt & Moritz Drupp & Frikk Nesje & Hendrik Hoegen, 2022. "Testing the free-rider hypothesis in climate policy," Papers 2211.06209, arXiv.org.
  32. Finus, Michael & Furini, Francesco & Rohrer, Anna Viktoria, 2021. "The efficacy of international environmental agreements when adaptation matters: Nash-Cournot vs Stackelberg leadership," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
  33. Takashima, Nobuyuki, 2023. "Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: Initial payment, technological development, and refunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
  34. Winston W. Chang, 2017. "World Trade and the Environment: Issues and Policies," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 435-479, August.
  35. Johannes Emmerling & Ulrike Kornek & Valentina Bosetti & Kai Lessmann, 2021. "Climate thresholds and heterogeneous regions: Implications for coalition formation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 293-316, April.
  36. Matthew McGinty, 2020. "Leadership and Free-Riding: Decomposing and Explaining the Paradox of Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(2), pages 449-474, October.
  37. Dijkstra, Bouwe R. & Nentjes, Andries, 2020. "Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
  38. Larry Karp & Hiroaki Sakamoto, 2018. "International environmental agreements without commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 508, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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