Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Allokationseffekte der Besteuerung im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes und des Einheitsprinzips


Author Info

  • Schröer, André
Registered author(s):


    Die Abgrenzung des Erfolges multinationaler Unternehmungen (MNU) für körper-schaftsteuerliche Zwecke erfolgt im Regelfall im Rahmen des Fremdvergleichsgrundsatzes, konkretisiert durch die Transferpreisrichtlinien der OECD. Dieses Erfolgsabgrenzungsparadigma steht im systematischen Gegensatz zu den ökonomischen Theorien der MNU und widerspricht der Auffassung von der MNU als integrierter Unternehmung. Es wird gezeigt, dass unter Berücksichtigung der Besteuerung als einzigem nicht natürlichem Standortfaktor steuerliche Transferpreisregelungen nur in wenigen Fällen Entscheidungsneutralität der Erfolgsabgrenzung sichern können; dieses gilt auch, wenn die Implikationen der Theorie der MNU ignoriert werden. Daher ist es aus ökonomischer Perspektive abzulehnen, unterschiedliche administrierte Verrechnungspreise zur Fingierung eines Fremdvergleiches zu setzen. Da sich die EU-Kommission in jüngerer Zeit verstärkt für die Einführung einer Einheitsbesteuerung für MNU im Binnenmarkt ausspricht, wird weiterhin gezeigt, unter welchen Umständen es zu einer effizienten Allokation im Rahmen einer nach US-amerikanischem Vorbild ausgestalteten Konzernbesteuerung kommen kann. -- In general, the allocation of income of multinational enterprises to several jurisdictions for corporate tax purposes follows the OECD standard of the arm?s length principle. In contrast to the theory of the multinational enterprise, delimination of income following this principle does not fit systematically to the theoretical perception of the multinational enterprise as an integrated business. We show that almost any transfer price for tax purposes except marginal-cost pricing disturbs the optimal production plan. Therefore, it is inadequate to fix arm?s length related transfer pricing schemes to value cross border activities for tax purposes. Since the EU-Commission favours a comprehensive approach to tax integrated businesses in Europe following the unitary pinciple, we specify conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources result.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 02-53.

    as in new window
    Date of creation: 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:569

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: L 7,1; D - 68161 Mannheim
    Phone: +49/621/1235-01
    Fax: +49/621/1235-224
    Web page:
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Multinationale Unternehmung; Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz; Einheitsprinzip; Entscheidungsneutralität;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. L. W. Copithorne, 1971. "International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 4(3), pages 324-41, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)



    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:569. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.