This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

International Transfer Pricing for Goods and Intangible Asset Licenses in a Decentralized Multinational Corporation: Review and Extensions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Peter C. Dawson () (Dallas, Texas)
Stephen M. Miller () (Department of Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We review and extend the core literature on international transfer price manipulation to avoid or evade taxes. Under negotiated transfer pricing with a viable bargaining structure, including performance evaluation disconnected from the transfer price, divisions voluntarily exchange accurate information to obtain firm-wide optimality, a result not dependent on restraint from exercising internal market power. For intangible licenses, a larger optimal profit shift for a given tax rate change strengthens incentives for transfer pricing abuse. In practice, an intangible’s arm’s length range is viewed as a guideline, a context where incentives for abuse materialize. Transfer pricing for intangibles obliges greater tax authority scrutiny.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.unlv.edu/projects/RePEc/pdf/0901.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2009
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0901.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 57 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nlv:wpaper:0901

Contact details of provider:
Phone: (702) 895-3776
Fax: (702) 895-1354
Web page: http://business.unlv.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Bill Robinson).

Related research
Keywords: Negotiated transfer pricing; licensing intangibles; decentralized MNC.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
L29 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Other
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Schjelderup, Guttorm & Sorgard, Lars, 1995. "The Multinational Firm, Transfer Pricing and the Nature of Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jean-Thomas Bernard & Robert J. Weiner, 1989. "Multinational Corporations, Transfer Prices, and Taxes: Evidence from the U.S. Petroleum Industry," NBER Working Papers 3013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Kant, Chander, 1988. "Endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 147-157, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," NBER Working Papers 3477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Jack Hirshleifer, 1956. "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29, pages 172. [Downloadable!]
  7. Spicer, Barry H., 1988. "Towards an organizational theory of the transfer pricing process," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 303-322, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Horst, Thomas, 1971. "The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behavior under Different Tariff and Tax Rates," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(5), pages 1059-72, Sept.-Oct. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. E. J. R. Booth & Oscar W. Jensen, 1977. "Transfer Prices in the Global Corporation under Internal and External Constraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 10(3), pages 434-46, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. L. W. Copithorne, 1971. "International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 4(3), pages 324-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.