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Prix de transfert optimaux et comportement stratŽgique des multinationales

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Author Info
Thierry MADIES (FacultŽ des sciences Žconomiques et sociales, UniversitŽ de Fribourg)

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Abstract

L'objet de cet article est de proposer un modle permettant de dŽterminer le prix de transfert optimal entre deux filiales d'une multinationale qui choisissent de faon dŽcentralisŽe les quantitŽs (concurrence ˆ la Cournot) ou les prix optimaux (concurrence ˆ la Bertrand) sur les marchŽs oligopolistiques o elles oprent. Nous montrons que le prix de transfert qui permet ˆ la multinationale de maximiser ses bŽnŽfices consolidŽs est fonction de trois effets : (1) un effet Ç transfert de bŽnŽfice È qui dŽpend de la comparaison des taux d'imp™t entre les deux pays o sont situŽs les filiales; (2) un Ç effet stratŽgique È qui provient de ce qu'un prix de transfert sous ŽvaluŽ (infŽrieur au cožt marginal de production de la filiale exportatrice) peut permettre ˆ la filiale Žtrangre d'tre plus agressive sur son marchŽ; (3) un Ç effet de rŽtroaction È qui constitue une force de rappel par rapport aux deuxime effet dans le sens o si les cožts marginaux de production de la filiales exportatrice sont croissants, une augmentation des quantitŽs vendues par la filiale Žtrangre rŽduit la production de la filiale exportatrice sur son propre marchŽ (et par lˆ mme ses profits). Nous montrons en outre que si les cožts de production ne sont plus identiques, le prix de transfert optimal sera d'autant plus faible dans une concurrence ˆ la Cournot que le cožt marginal de production de la filiale exportatrice est lui-mme faible. Nous Žtudions enfin les conditions (fiscales) sous lesquelles la multinationale peut exclure les entreprises concurrentes du marchŽ du bien final quand elle les approvisionne en input intermŽdiaire.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2003043.

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Length: 20
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2003043

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Related research
Keywords: Multinationale; prix de transfert; fiscalitŽ internationale; transfert de bŽnŽfice;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jack Hirshleifer, 1956. "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29, pages 172. [Downloadable!]
  3. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kant, Chander, 1990. "Multinational firms and government revenues," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 135-147, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Guttorm Schjelderup & Lars Sorgard, 1997. "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 277-290, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. L. W. Copithorne, 1971. "International Corporate Transfer Prices and Government Policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 4(3), pages 324-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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