On the construction of social preferences in lab experiments
AbstractThis paper studies the construction of social preferences in the lab. Experimental subjects have the opportunity to donate to a charity and to allocate money in a conventional dictator game. The results show that charitable donations and dictator game allocations are positively correlated. The correlation is only significant, however, if the dictator game follows the donation decision. Furthermore, while donation behavior is independent from the order of play, dictator game behavior is not. In line with the constructive-preference approach, we argue that preferences are instable and sensitive to outside influences when subjects are confronted with a new decision situation, while in a well-known situation preferences are more stable. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research in its series ZEW Discussion Papers with number 10-085.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
social preferences; charitable donations; dictator game; experiment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-12-11 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-12-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-12-11 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-12-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2010-12-11 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pablo Brañas-Garza, 2003.
"Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity,"
IESA Working Papers Series
0303, Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research.
- Pablo Brañas Garza, 2003. "Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/50, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- John Smith, 2012.
"The endogenous nature of the measurement of social preferences,"
Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences,
Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 11(2), pages 235-256, December.
- Smith, John, 2010. "The endogenous nature of the measurement of social preferences," MPRA Paper 23282, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ulrik H. Nielsen, 2014. "Parents' Education and their Adult Offspring's Other-Regarding Behavour," Discussion Papers 14-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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