IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/wzbmbh/spii2018208.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Selfless ignorance: Too good to be true

Author

Listed:
  • Moradi, Homayoon

Abstract

We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate whether people avoid information altruistically. After learning about a product with positive externalities, a consumer may avoid learning the cost of the product so that she does not hesitate to act altruistically. We find that although a few altruistic people avoid information about their own costs, this does not change the overall rate of altruistic behavior. The result suggests that although concealing costs upfront might make a few people let go of learning them, it does not increase the rate of altruistic behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Moradi, Homayoon, 2018. "Selfless ignorance: Too good to be true," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2018-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018208
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/194000/1/1067597239.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben Greiner, 2015. "Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 114-125, July.
    2. Zachary Grossman, 2014. "Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(11), pages 2659-2665, November.
    3. Christine L. Exley, 2016. "Excusing Selfishness in Charitable Giving: The Role of Risk," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 587-628.
    4. Homayoon Moradi & Alexander Nesterov, 2018. "Moral Wiggle Room Reverted: Information Avoidance is Myopic," HSE Working papers WP BRP 189/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. Zachary Grossman & Joël J. van der Weele, 2017. "Self-Image and Willful Ignorance in Social Decisions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 173-217.
    6. Larry G. Epstein, 1999. "A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(3), pages 579-608.
    7. Feiler, Lauren, 2014. "Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 253-267.
    8. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
    9. Russell Golman & David Hagmann & George Loewenstein, 2017. "Information Avoidance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 96-135, March.
    10. Kandul, Serhiy & Ritov, Ilana, 2017. "Close your eyes and be nice: Deliberate ignorance behind pro-social choices," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 54-56.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2023. "Information avoidance: Self-image concerns, inattention, and ideology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 386-400.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2023. "Information avoidance: Self-image concerns, inattention, and ideology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 386-400.
    2. Friedrichsen, Jana & Momsen, Katharina & Piasenti, Stefano, 2022. "Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 100, pages 1-1.
    3. Friedrichsen, Jana & Momsen, Katharina & Piasenti, Stefano, 2022. "Ignorance, intention and stochastic outcomes☆," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    4. Robert Stüber, 2020. "The benefit of the doubt: willful ignorance and altruistic punishment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 848-872, September.
    5. Stüber, Robert, 2019. "The benefit of the doubt: Willful ignorance and altruistic punishment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-215, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Orland, 2020. "Do people harness deliberate ignorance to avoid envy and its detrimental effects?," CEPA Discussion Papers 17, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
    7. Marta Serra-Garcia & Nora Szech, 2022. "The (In)Elasticity of Moral Ignorance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4815-4834, July.
    8. Jannis Engel & Nora Szech, 2020. "A little good is good enough: Ethical consumption, cheap excuses, and moral self-licensing," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(1), pages 1-19, January.
    9. Lind, Jo Thori & Nyborg, Karine & Pauls, Anna, 2019. "Save the planet or close your eyes? Testing strategic ignorance in a charity context," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 9-19.
    10. Christine L. Exley & Judd Kessler, 2017. "The Better is the Enemy of the Good," Working Papers 2017-068, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    11. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2020. "Expressive Voting vs. Self-Serving Ignorance," Working Papers 2020-33, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    12. Claire Rimbaud & Alice Soldà, 2021. "Avoiding the Cost of your Conscience: Belief Dependent Preferences and Information Acquisition," Working Papers 2114, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    13. David Klinowski, 2021. "Reluctant donors and their reactions to social information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 515-535, June.
    14. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2023. "Expressive voting versus information avoidance: experimental evidence in the context of climate change mitigation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 45-74, January.
    15. Homayoon Moradi & Alexander Nesterov, 2018. "Moral Wiggle Room Reverted: Information Avoidance is Myopic," HSE Working papers WP BRP 189/EC/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    16. Konstantin Offer & Dorothee Mischkowski & Zoe Rahwan & Christoph Engel, 2024. "Deliberately Ignoring Unfairness: Responses to Uncertain Inequality in the Ultimatum Game," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2024_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    17. Jonas Nordström & Linda Thunström & Klaas van ’t Veld & Jason F. Shogren & Mariah Ehmke, 2018. "Strategic Ignorance of Health Risk: Its Causes and Policy Consequences," IFRO Working Paper 2018/09, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    18. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2022. "Information avoidance, selective exposure, and fake (?) news: Theory and experimental evidence on green consumption," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    19. Momsen, Katharina & Ohndorf, Markus, 2020. "Information Avoidance, Selective Exposure, and Fake(?) News - A Market Experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224637, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Katharina Momsen & Markus Ohndorf, 2019. "Information Avoidance, Selective Exposure, and Fake(?) News-A Green Market Experiment," Working Papers 2019-18, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pro-social behavior; Self-Image; Information Avoidance; Moral Wiggle Room;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2018208. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vawzbde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.