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Pensions with early retirement and without commitment

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  • Neugart, Michael

Abstract

In this paper it is shown that more generous early retirement provisions as well as lower employment lead to lower steady state pension rates if governments weigh the welfare of the older persons relatively strongly. A relatively stronger weight on the welfare of the young reverses the results. The driving forces behind those findings are governments that cannot commit to pension policies and consequently take into account future governments' policies when maximizing electoral support from the currently young and old constituencies. -- In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, dass Pensionssysteme mit generöseren Frühverrentungsregelungen sowie niedrigere Beschäftigungsquoten geringere Pensionen zur Folge haben, falls Regierungen die Wohlfahrt der Pensionäre stärker gewichten als die der jüngeren Generation. Gewichtet die jeweilige Regierung in ihrer Entscheidung über die Pensionspolitik die Wohlfahrt der jüngeren Generation stärker als die der älteren Generation, so kehrt sich das Ergebnis ins Gegenteil um. Die Ergebnisse beruhen im Wesentlichen auf der Annahme, dass die Pensionspolitiken heutiger Regierungen für zukünftige Regierungen nicht bindend sind. Im Bestreben um die maximale Zustimmung der heutigen Wählerschaft berücksichtigen Regierungen daher die Folgen der Pensionspolitiken nachfolgender Regierung auf die derzeit noch jüngere Generation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment with number SP I 2006-120.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzblpe:spi2006120

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  1. Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1999. "Social Security in Theory and Practice (I): Facts and Political Theories," NBER Working Papers 7118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
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