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Financial market lobbies and pension reform

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Author Info

  • Kemmerling, Achim
  • Neugart, Michael

Abstract

We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in Europe exemplifying the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 25 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 163-173

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:163-173

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

Related research

Keywords: Pension reform Political economy of pension systems Lobbying Financial market Institutional investors;

References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Cai Cai Du & Joan Muysken & Olaf Sleijpen, 2011. "Economy wide risk diversification in a three-pillar pension system," DNB Working Papers 286, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Is German domestic social policy politically controversial?," Munich Reprints in Economics 19274, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. Bilin Neyapti, 2010. "Modeling Institutional Evolution," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1012, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  4. Giacomo Corneo & Matthias Keese & Carsten Schröder, 2010. "The Eff ect of Saving Subsidies on Household Saving – Evidence from Germanys," Ruhr Economic Papers 0170, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.

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