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Mediation - Boon or Bane for the Stability and Efficiency of Marriage?

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  • Rundshagen, Bianca
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    Abstract

    Using non-cooperative game theory the effects of mediation on the divorce rate and on the utility of the spouses are analysed. Two kinds of mediation are considered: restricted mediation that reduces the costs of divorce and extended mediation that additionally may prevent divorces by demonstrating the potential for Pareto-improvements within marriage to the spouses. It is shown that restricted mediation not only may increase the divorce rate but that also both kinds of mediation are not necessarily welfare improving compared to the reference scenario without mediation. --

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    Paper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order with number 79840.

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    Date of creation: 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79840

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    1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
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    7. Zhylyevskyy, Oleksandr, 2012. "Spousal Conflict and Divorce," Staff General Research Papers 34813, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
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    10. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, September.
    11. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 2007. "The American Family and Family Economics," NBER Working Papers 12908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1995. " Family Policy with Non-cooperative Families," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 581-601, December.
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    14. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, July.
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