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Composition of supervisory boards in Germany: Inside or outside control of banks?

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  • Andreani, Ettore
  • Dummann, Kathrin
  • Neuberger, Doris

Abstract

This paper examines the composition of supervisory boards of German banks for a sample of 41 large banks in the period 1999-2006. We find that the supervisory board structure reflects both outside control by shareholders and inside control by stakeholders. Most of the non-employee board members are representatives of other banks and industrial companies. The high presence of former executives and German board members indicates inside control. In banks controlled by other banks or insurance companies it is less likely that the chairperson of the supervisory board is a former executive of the same bank. Over time, inside networking through the supervisory board decreased. --

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rostock, Institute of Economics in its series Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory with number 103.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:roswps:103

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Related research

Keywords: corporate governance; dual board system; principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; banks;

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