Transboundary pollution, R&D spillovers, absorptive capacity and international trade
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social optimum. In the presence of free R&D spillovers between countries, as well as the investment in absorptive research, the competition of firms on a common market helps non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. We find that in autarky and common market cases the investment in absorptive R&D leads to multiple non-cooperative equilibria, which may necessitate competing regulators to coordinate an equilibrium. Interestingly, opening markets to international trade increases the per-unit emission-tax and the per-unit original research subsidy. It causes a higher investment in original research and production, and a lower emission ratio. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2013-23.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Transboundary pollution; R&D spillovers; absorptive capacity; international trade;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2013-03-30 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-ENE-2013-03-30 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-03-30 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-INO-2013-03-30 (Innovation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Slim Ben Youssef, 2009.
"Transboundary pollution, R&D spillovers and international trade,"
The Annals of Regional Science,
Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 235-250, March.
- Slim Ben Youssef, 2003. "Transboundary Pollution, R&D Spillovers and International Trade," Working Papers 2003.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 1999. "A Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-Tournament R & D Duopoly," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 253-262, November.
- Ben Youssef, Slim, 2009. "Transboundary Pollution and Absorptive Capacity," MPRA Paper 17158, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ben Youssef, Slim & Zaccour, Georges, 2009. "Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, Emissions Taxes and R&D Subsidies," MPRA Paper 16984, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2009.
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