Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale
[Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D]
AbstractWe develop a three stage game model composed of a regulator and two firms. These firms compete on the same market where they offer the same homogeneous good, and can invest in R&D to lower their emission/output ratio. By means of a tax per-unit of pollution and a subsidy per-unit of R&D level, the regulator can induce the first best outcome, when the marginal cost of production is increasing. This is not the case when the marginal cost of production is constant.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20596.
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision: Feb 2010
Duopole; Taxe d'émission; Subvention de R&D; Optimum de premier ordre; Coût marginal croissant.;
Other versions of this item:
- Ben Youssef, Slim & Dinar, Zeineb, 2009.
"Régulation d'un duopole et R&D environnementale
[Regulation of a duopoly and environmental R&D]," MPRA Paper 22385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2010.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-84064, Tilburg University.
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