Timing of adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and international trade
AbstractThe authors consider a symmetric model composed of two countries and a firm in each country. Firms produce the same good by means of a polluting technology which uses fossil energy. However, these firms can adopt a clean technology which uses a renewable energy having a lower unit cost. Surprisingly, opening markets to international competition increases the per-unit emission-tax and decreases the per-unit production subsidy. Interestingly, the socially optimal adoption date under a common market better internalizes transboundary pollution than that under autarky. It also better internalizes transboundary pollution compared with the optimal adoption dates for firms. In autarky (resp. a common market), firms adopt the clean technology earlier (resp. later) than what is socially optimal and, therefore, regulators can induce clean technology adoption at the socially optimal adoption date by giving firms postpone (resp. speed up) adoption subsidies. Opening markets to international trade, speeds up socially optimal adoption dates and delays optimal adoption dates for firms. Consequently, with market opening, speed up adoption subsidies are needed to reduce the global flow of pollution. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Economics Discussion Papers with number 2013-50.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
regulation; adoption date; renewable energy; transboundary pollution; common;
Other versions of this item:
- Ben Jebli, Mehdi & Ben Youssef, Slim, 2012. "Timing of adoption of clean technologies, transboundary pollution and international trade," MPRA Paper 42467, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- Q42 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Alternative Energy Sources
- Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-10-02 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-10-02 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2013-10-02 (Resource Economics)
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