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Die Genossenschaftliche Institutssicherung – ein notwendiges Instrument zur Stärkung des Kundenvertrauens und des Risikomanagements im dezentralen Bankenverbund

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  • Gleber, Peter

Abstract

Cooperative Institutional Protection – a Necessary Instrument for Strengthening Customer Trust and Risk Management in Local Banking Groups: The protection scheme of the cooperative financial network goes back to the guarantee funds of the German ‹Volksbanken›, the world's oldest privately-financed protection system for banks. The core task of institutional protection is to protect the cooperative banks and hence the protection of the member's and customers' deposits, investments and savings. The local roots of the credit cooperatives rest in the 19th century. During the so-called formative phase, protection schemes were established for the newly-created cooperative lending networks of ‹Volksbanken› and rural cooperative banks, which have been a joint cooperative financial network since 1972. Since that time, the cooperative banks' combined protection scheme has developed into a unique protection system with complex tools for risk management.

Suggested Citation

  • Gleber, Peter, 2017. "Die Genossenschaftliche Institutssicherung – ein notwendiges Instrument zur Stärkung des Kundenvertrauens und des Risikomanagements im dezentralen Bankenverbund," IBF Paper Series 05-17, IBF – Institut für Bank- und Finanzgeschichte / Institute for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ibfpps:0517
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    1. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 283-295, June.
    2. Pier Carlo Padoan & Paul A. Brenton & Gavin Boyd (ed.), 2003. "The Structural Foundations of International Finance," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3084.
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    Cited by:

    1. Horsch Andreas & Kleinow Jacob & Schiele Christian, 2018. "Proportionale Bankenregulierung: Chance für Genossenschaftsbanken?," Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, De Gruyter, vol. 68(1), pages 56-65, March.
    2. Gleber Peter, 2018. "Selbstbestimmtes Sparen durch Genossenschaften: Ein historischer Überblick," Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, De Gruyter, vol. 68(2), pages 122-130, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N24 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N34 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Europe: 1913-
    • N94 - Economic History - - Regional and Urban History - - - Europe: 1913-
    • P13 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Cooperative Enterprises

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