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Liquidity and solvency problems during the banking crises of the National Banking Era

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  • Körnert, Jan

Abstract

Liquidity and solvency are conditional for banks' existence, They are endangered during banking crises. Since the banking crises of the National Banking Era in the USA are no exceptions, the question remains whether the foundation of the Federal Reserve System offered an adequate solution to the relevant problems of the era, The study concludes that the introduction of the Federal Reserve System offered a good chance to solve the structural problems. On the other side, the Federal Reserve System would not have been in a position to come to the aid of troubled banks in the crises of 1890, 1873 and 1884 - either due to solvency problems or runs by depositors.

Suggested Citation

  • Körnert, Jan, 2006. "Liquidity and solvency problems during the banking crises of the National Banking Era," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 05/2006, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:grewdp:052006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking Crises; National Banking Era; Liquidity; Solvency; Federal Reserve System;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets

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