The Domino Effect and the Supervision of the Banking System
AbstractThis paper models the domino effect and defines a measurement for t he necessity of banking supervision. The effect of several factors, such as the desired stability of the banking system, its size, the amount of negative externalities that are considered by banks, and supervisory costs, on the necessity of supervision are studied. For instance, it was found that under certain circumstances supervision becomes less essential if the number of banks increases. The paper emphasizes that objective difficulties in the supervision of banks, by simply imposing restrictions on their activities, are intrinsic to the operation of the banks themselves. Copyright 1988 by American Finance Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.
Volume (Year): 43 (1988)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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- Kornert, Jan, 2003. "The Barings crises of 1890 and 1995: causes, courses, consequences and the danger of domino effects," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 187-209, July.
- Körnert, Jan, 2006. "Liquidity and solvency problems during the banking crises of the National Banking Era," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 05/2006, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
- De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000.
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- Landskroner, Yoram & Paroush, Jacob, 2008. "Bank management and market discipline," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 395-414.
- George Sheldon, 1995. "A Limit-Risk Capital Adequacy Rule: An Alternative Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation for Banks with an Empirical Application to Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 131(IV), pages 773-805, December.
- Körnert, Jan, 2006. "Analyse der Finanzmärkte der USA in den fünf Bankenkrisen der National Banking-Ära," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 01/2006, Ernst Moritz Arndt University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
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