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Metaphern, Begriffe und Bedeutungen: Das Beispiel internationale monetäre Institutionen

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  • Muchlinski, Elke
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    Abstract

    Das Ziel des Forschungsvorhabens besteht zum einen darin, die Bedeutungskonstitution zu untersuchen. Zum anderen soll gezeigt werden, dass nationale und internationale monetäre Institutionen in ihren Kommunikationsformen nicht einem linear-kausalen Kommunikationsmodell folgen. Der neue methodische Ansatz versteht sich komplementär zu den formal analytischen Begriffskonstruktionen. Ökonomie als Erfahrungswissenschaft bedarf eines vielfältigen Methodenrepertoires. Die Unabdingbarkeit der Methodenvielfalt resultiert aus dem Mandat der Preisstabilität der Zentralbanken, das sie im Kontext von Unsicherheit über die Steuerung der Erwartungen der Finanzmarktakteure zu erfüllen versuchen. Die Erwartungssteuerung gelingt nicht als lineare Projektion gegebener Erwartungen oder Bedeutungen. Sie gelingt über die Sprachvermitteltheit, die Verwendung von Metaphern und Begriffen in ökonomischen Interaktionen. Bedeutungen sind nicht ex ante gegeben. Der innovative Ansatz soll anhand der Entwicklung der Amerikanischen und Europäischen Zentralbank sowie der Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich weiterentwickelt und überprüft werden. Das Projekt verbindet den Forschungsstand zu monetären Institutionen mit der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. --

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2010/14.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201014

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