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On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

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Author Info
Tomaso Duso,
Enrico Pennings
Jo Seldeslachts

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Abstract

Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - Trotz einer Vielzahl von theoretischen Studien, die zeigen, dass Kollusion durch Forschungsallianzen erleichtert werden kann, fehlen empirische Arbeiten, die diesen Zusammenhang bestätigen. Noch erstaunlicher ist die allgemein geringe Anzahl von empirischen Untersuchungen auf dem Forschungsgebiet der Kollusion. Dieser Aufsatz versucht diese Lücke zu schließen wobei unterstellt wird, dass ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Stabilität von Joint-Ventures und der Entstehung von Kollusionen besteht. Anhand von Daten des U.S. National Cooperation Research Act zeigen wir, dass große Forschungsallianzen in stark konzentrierten Branchen stabiler und daher eher der Absprache verdächtig sind.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number SP II 2008-15.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2008-15

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Related research
Keywords: Research Joint Ventures; Product Market Collusion; Empirical Test;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Helder Vasconcelos, 2004. "Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 219-241, 05. [Downloadable!]
  2. Vonortas, Nicholas S., 1997. "Research joint ventures in the US," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4-5), pages 577-595, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Eliane Catilina & Robert Feinberg, 2006. "Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 129-144, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reuer, Jeffrey J. & Zollo, Maurizio, 2005. "Termination outcomes of research alliances," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 101-115, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tomaso Duso & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2007. "The Dynamics of Research Joint Ventures: A Panel Data Analysis," Discussion Papers 221, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2000. "R&D cooperation and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1033-1047, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Thomas W. Ross, 2009. "Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 31-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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