Market Power and Incentives to Form Research Consortia
AbstractIt is well known that instability is a limit to the formation of cartels, and that some synergies are required to give cartel members an advantage over outsiders. In this paper, we explore theoretically the linkage between cost-reduction alliances (like research joint ventures) and the formation of cartels. The former have negative external impacts on outsiders, while the latter have positive external effects on outside (independent) competitors. We find that when the decisions to join both are made simultaneously the cartel can be profitable and stable for a smaller number of members than previously found for cartel formation alone by Salant et al. (1983, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 185–199). This result follows both for open membership and exclusive membership rules, and suggests a possible anticompetitive impact of research joint ventures. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 28 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
cartel; group formation; RJV; D21; D43;
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- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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- Gianluca Femminis & Gianmaria Martini, 2008. "Extended RJV cooperation and social welfare," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0852, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
- J. Seldeslachts & T. Duso & E. Pennings, 2012.
"On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion,"
Review of Business and Economic Literature,
Intersentia, vol. 57(1), pages 98-109, March.
- Tomaso Duso, & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2008. "On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," CIG Working Papers SP II 2008-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Seldeslachts, Jo & Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico, 2008. "On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 240, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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