Entry Effects on Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee
AbstractWe extend Green and Porter's (1984) model to consider entry, by studying two alternative types of incumbent firms' post-entry reactions: cartel breakdown and accommodation of the entrants. We show that cooperation is more unstable if entry costs are low and if incumbents accommodate the new firms. We then test the applicability of the theoretical model to the type of collusion that characterizes the nineteenth-century railroad cartel in the US. The results provide support for the model predictions. In particular, cartel stability has been found to be negatively correlated with the number of firms in the agreement.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (05)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
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- Tomaso Duso, & Enrico Pennings & Jo Seldeslachts, 2008.
"On The Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2008-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Seldeslachts, Jo & Duso, Tomaso & Pennings, Enrico, 2008. "On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 240, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Goppelsroeder, Marie, 2009. "Entry in Collusive Markets: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 14707, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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