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Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media

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Author Info
Suphachol Suphachalasai (University of Cambridge)

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Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between a bureaucracy and mass media industry, and its implications to corruption. We develop a bureaucratic model of corruption with mass media. A representative profit maximizing media firm seeks for corruption news to be printed and sold. Channels through which competition in media industry and press freedom affect equilibrium corruption in a bureaucracy are modeled. Different degrees of media freedom and competition affect production and employment decisions of media firms, and this in turn affects the effectiveness of media in monitoring corruption. Competition and freedom in media sector also have an influence on bureaucratic structure and consequently on equilibrium corruption. We find that the degree of competition in media market plays a significant role in controlling corruption. Freedom of media also reduces corruption. Empirical results support these findings. Media competition appears to be a more important tool to combat corruption than press freedom. The corruption problem in Italy could be reduced to the level experienced by France if the competitiveness of its media industry was to be improved to the same level as that of United Kingdom.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 0502014.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 24 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0502014

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32. Environmental Economy and Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series 05.2005, Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: Corrupton Bureaucracy Mass Media

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  3. Brunetti, Aymo & Weder, Beatrice, 2003. "A free press is bad news for corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(7-8), pages 1801-1824, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1999. "Rents, Competition, and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 982-993, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2002. "The Political Economy Of Government Responsiveness: Theory And Evidence From India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1415-1451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Jain, Arvind K, 2001. " Corruption: A Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 71-121, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Simeon Djankov & Caralee McLiesh & Tatiana Nenova & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Who Owns the Media?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1919, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2000. "Decentralization and corruption - evidence across countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2290, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  9. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-38, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore & de Tommaso, Giulio & Mukherjee, Amitabha, 1997. "An international statistical survey of government employment and wages," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1806, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rudiger Ahrend, 2002. "Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers 2002-11, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  12. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," DELTA Working Papers 97-06, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
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  13. Stromberg, David, 2001. "Mass media and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 652-663, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rauch, James E. & Evans, Peter B., 2000. "Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 49-71, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Timothy Besley & Andrea Prat, 2006. "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 720-736, June.
    Other versions:
  16. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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