The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption
AbstractVoters use the press to keep politicians accountable. By endogenizing the response of the voters, this paper provides a theoretical foundation to disentangle the effects of media regulation on corruption and clarify under which circumstances regulation reduces or increases corruption. The analysis shows that libel laws can reduce political corruption only if the moral hazard problem dominates adverse selection and the punishment for the defamer is large enough to deter the publication of well-founded scandals. In this case, libel laws act as a substitute for an optimal re-election rule to which voters commit ex ante.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2012-21A.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
media and democracy; corruption; defamation; chilling effect.;
Other versions of this item:
- Gabriele Gratton, 2012. "The Sound of Silence: Anti-Defamation Law and Political Corruption," Discussion Papers 2012-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-06-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2013-06-16 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-06-16 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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