The impact of coordination and information on transport procurement
AbstractTransport cost is second in importance after production cost in industry. It is the purpose of the present paper to study the impact of information sharing and contractual instruments between a supply chain and its transport suppliers. After reviewing the literature, we propose a model to measure the benefits in terms of transport cost and standard deviation of transport cost. We evaluate three scenarios over one period reiterated for a shipper carrier two-echelon model with a mix of long- term and short-term procurement strategies: perfect information, asymmetric information and private information at one level of the supply chain. We evaluate the transfer in rent between carrier and shipper according to the information known and give some insights on optimal contract parameters.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0504007.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 21 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. Prepared from Word, figures included, formulas by MathType
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Supply chain management; coordination; contracts; information sharing; game theory; mechanisms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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