Network Formation with Heterogenous Agents
AbstractThe present paper analyzes a network formation problem, mainly based on the framework presented in Bala and Goyal (2000). We depart from their assumptions in two crucial aspects. On one hand, we assume that connecting to an agent pays of not only for the number of connections that the agent can provide but also for her intrinsic value. Since the values of the agents (which represent the amounts of information held by the agents) difer from agent to agent, we are introducing heterogeneity in the framework. On the other hand, we assume that each path connecting two agents has an associated cost which is the sum of the number of edges it includes. We obtain as a result that the only Nash structure is the circle network, which emerges as a robust and optimal structure that maximizes the beneﬁts of the interactions among agents while at the same time it minimizes the costs of network formation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number 0301002.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 18 Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; prepared on IBM PC; to print on HP; pages: 14 ; figures: included. 14 pages, pdf, prepared from dvips - figures included
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network; game theory; heterogeneity; circle network;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-01-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2003-01-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2003-01-30 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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