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Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank

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Author Info
Philipp Maier (De Nederlandsche Bank)
Saskia Bezoen (De Nederlandsche Bank)

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Abstract

Central banks do not operate in a vacuum. In this paper we analyse the fac-tors leading to external pressure or public support for European monetary policy. Moreover, based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, some additional les-sons are drawn for the ECB. External pressure on the ECB mainly stems from politi-cians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly try to influ-ence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat for governments to lose their majority in the next election. This latter source of pressure is, however, likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0209001.

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Date of creation: 05 Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0209001

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thornton, Daniel L & Batten, Dallas S, 1985. "Lag-Length Selection and Tests of Granger Causality between Money and Income," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 164-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hayo, Bernd, 1998. "Inflation culture, central bank independence and price stability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 241-263, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Piga, Gustavo, 2000. " Dependent and Accountable: Evidence from the Modern Theory of Central Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(5), pages 563-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Froyen, Richard T. & Havrilesky, Thomas & Waud, Roger N., 1997. "The Asymmetric Effects of Political Pressures on U.S. Monetary Policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 471-493, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Ahking, Francis W. & Miller, Stephen M., 1985. "The relationship between government deficits, money growthm and inflation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 447-467. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1997. "How opportunistic are partisan German central bankers: Evidence on the Vaubel hypothesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 807-821, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Jakob de Haan, 1997. "The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 395-426, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Waller, Christopher J, 1991. "Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-13, January.
  10. Maier, Philipp & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & de Haan, Jakob, 2002. "Political pressure on the Bundesbank: an empirical investigation using the Havrilesky approach," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 103-123, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Berger, Helge & Haan, Jakob de & Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Hsiao, Cheng, 1981. "Autoregressive modelling and money-income causality detection," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 85-106. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Philipp Maier & Maarten Hendrikx, 2002. "Implications of EMU enlargement for European monetary policy: A political economy view," Macroeconomics 0207007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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