Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Waller, Christopher J

Abstract

Political pressure, or "bashing," by the administration is typically believed to be one way that the administration can coerce an otherwise independent central bank into following the administration's preferred monetary policy path. This paper develops a model for analyzing this type of policy "cooperation" and demonstrates that bashing the central bank creates uncertainty on the part of private agents with regard to future policy actions, which translates into real wage and output variability. Hence, although beneficial to the administration, political pressure creates uncertainty and thus economic instability. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 29 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-13

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:1-13

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Phone: 714-965-8800
Fax: 01865 267 985
Email:
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
  2. Philipp Maier & Saskia Bezoen, 2002. "Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank," Macroeconomics 0209001, EconWPA.
  3. Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Etienne Farvaque, 2012. "Public Attitudes towards Central Bank Independence: Lessons From the Foundation of the ECB," Working Papers hal-00988169, HAL.
  4. M.A. Jenkins, 1996. "Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 241-270.
  5. Maier, Philipp & Bezoen, Saskia, 2004. "Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 923-939, November.
  6. Farvaque, Etienne & Lagadec, Gaƫl, 2001. "Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy," ZEI Working Papers B 01-2001, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  7. M.A. Jenkins, 1996. "Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(197), pages 241-270.
  8. Ansgar Belke & Thorsten Polleit, 2010. "How much fiscal backing must the ECB have? The euro area is not (yet) the Philippines," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 124.
  9. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:29:y:1991:i:1:p:1-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.