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Internet Auctions: Description, Bidders' Profiles and Implications

Author

Listed:
  • Chokri Dridi

    (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Abstract

The increasing quantity of items bough and sold over the internet led to the success of internet auctions, to the introduction of new auction rules and the creation of new businesses and merger among existing ones. In this paper, we present a description of existing internet auction rules and typical profile of consumers who use them. We found that bidders are most likely located in the U.S., have some internet experience and skills and that they belong to the 26-50 years old age group. We also discuss the implication of online auctions on resource allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Chokri Dridi, 2005. "Internet Auctions: Description, Bidders' Profiles and Implications," Industrial Organization 0502015, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0502015
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 38. (Spring 2000)
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    File URL: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/io/papers/0502/0502015.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucking-Reiley, David, 2000. "Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 227-252, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Internet Auctions; Online Auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • L - Industrial Organization

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