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Evolutionary Stability of Constant Consistent Conjectures

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Author Info
Alex Possajennikov (University of Nottingham)

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Abstract

The paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and evolutionary stability of conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates for evolutionary stability.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0405/0405009.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0405009.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 17 May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0405009

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: consistent conjectures; evolutionarily stable strategy; indirect evolution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Muller, W. & Normann, H., 2003. "Conjectural variations and evolutionary stability: a new rationale for consistency," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bresnahan, Timothy F, 1981. "Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 934-45, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Costrell, Robert M., 1991. "Immiserizing growth with semi-public goods under consistent conjectures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 383-389, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Dixon, Huw D. & Somma, Ernesto, 2003. "The evolution of consistent conjectures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 523-536, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Boyer, M. & Moreaux, M., 1982. "Consistent Versus Non-Consistent Conjectures in Duopoly Theory: Some Examples," Cahiers de recherche 8206, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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