Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency
AbstractAdopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate the rival's behavior correctly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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- Nicolas Quérou & Mabel Tidball, 2009. "Consistent Conjectures in a Dynamic Model of Non-renewable Resource Management," Working Papers 09-28, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
- Paulo Brito & Bipasa Datta & Huw Dixon, 2012. "The evolution of the mixed conjectures in the rent-extraction game," Discussion Papers 12/33, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Possajennikov, Alex, 2009. "The evolutionary stability of constant consistent conjectures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 21-29, October.
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